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NAFTA VIS A VIS THE E.U.-SIMILARITIES AND
DIFFERENCES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON MEMBER
COUNTRIES
William C. Graham*
I must confess, I am somewhat nervous speaking to this audience of
some of my former colleagues and one or two of my former students
and certainly many practitioners, who know a great deal more about this
subject than I do. So I am going to immediately take the refuge of the
scoundrel.
Actually, your speech gave me a thought. Perhaps I could take the
ultimate refuge of a person living in a bilingual country and give my
talk in French. This is the way we often are able to obfuscate the things
we all experience.
But what really makes me nervous, apart from the professional
quality of the people in this room, is that there are so many of you.
When I give my speeches in the House of Commons these days, there
are never as many people present there as are present in this room. That
used to embarrass me a great deal until I went down and visited Mr.
Gillman, who is Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in Washington. He took me into the House of Representatives, and I realized
there were even fewer people in there when they were speaking.
I think there is at least one cultural thing in common between Canadians and Americans, and that is that politicians do not like to listen to
one another. I do not know how that is going to play into the Mexican
dimension of things of this part of our relationship. We are going to
have an election in a few weeks in Canada, so there was much pressure
on me not to leave home, to stay there and try to get things cleared up
before the election got going.
I suddenly discovered that, again, there is a cultural difference between Canadian politicians and American politicians. In the United
States, at least, it seems that the politicians are all so busy. They have
very little time to pay attention to anything because they are so busy
. William C. Graham is the Chairman of the House of Commons Standing Committee
on
Foreign Affairs in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
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raising money.
In our country, which is a parliamentary democracy, we are all kept
busy by the Prime Minister's office to make sure we do not get into
trouble. We are given many tasks to do, none of which have any importance or significance. We are kept busy for the sake of being busy, to
keep ourselves out of one another's hair.
I have got to challenge one statement made earlier in the day about
Canada and the United States being similar in that they are common-law
jurisdictions. I want to remind Beatrice of the fact that Canada also has
the distinction of being a civil law jurisdiction, thanks to the presence of
the Province of Quebec. We believe that this is one of the secret weapons we have got. We are going to use it to be able to ally ourselves
with the Mexicans on many things and, thereby, defeat the perfidious
aims of the United States in most of these trade agreements.
Finally, let me say that I have prepared a paper which will eventually be distributed, and I want to thank Suh Kim, who is here. She who
was really the co-author of it. The serious part of the paper with the
assumes and the anecdotes are mine. I really think, perhaps, since this is
supposed to be the luncheon speech, I can be more anecdotal than serious. That is perhaps only fair, largely because much of what I have in
terms of recent experience that I think I can share with this group, that
would be of interest to you, is not the profound legal reflections and the
scholarship, which has really come from others who will be speaking,
but more just some experience that I have gleaned from my political
experience as Chairman of the Committee, which has been largely involved in trade and economic matters.
Obviously, the Arctic study, which the Dean mentioned, is largely
circumpolar and political in respect, but it also has a trade dimension to
it, in terms of the trade in American products and how it will work. But
a great deal of the work our committee has done has been involved
with trade matters. We recently did a study of our Special Import Measures Act (SIMA) legislation on anti-dumping and countervailing duty
legislation. We did an extensive review of that and reported what changes should be made to that legislation, a report that went into Parliament
just at the end of 1996. In terms of legislation, we have dealt with the
WTO legislation; we have dealt with the Canada/Chile Free Trade
Agreement; and the Canada/Israel Free Trade Agreement in the House
recently. So we have had many discussions on these issues, and I have
also had the privilege of discussing them quite often with my American
colleagues.
One of the privileges of being a member of Parliament is that, if
you are a member of the Canada/U.S. Joint Parliamentary Delegation,
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you get an opportunity to see your American colleagues on a fairly
regular basis. We get together once a year for about a week of intensive
meetings. Last year we had great fun. Senator Mikuski arranged for a
boat to take us up the west coast to Alaska. We spent five days on a
boat with congressmen and senators. It was an opportunity for us and
our wives to get to know each other very, very well. We got the opportunity to exchange views on the very issues that we are talking about
today. You got a sense of what the people really feel, but maybe I can
convey some of that to you.
When Henry originally asked me to talk about this topic, I think he
picked it out because he thought that, because I taught European Community Law, it would be a good idea. I realize, of course, since he
asked me to do it, I thought it was a good idea the first time, too. But
now having done the work, it has struck me that it was a dreadful mistake, because, as it became evident this morning, NAFTA and the European Union really are not very comparable. I mean, they have a comparability in the sense that all human institutions have some similar features to them, and, really, both NAFTA and the European Union are
trying to come to grips with the same problems. How do you manage
the effects of international economic integration? What institutions do
you put in place to manage that integration? So, in that sense, they are
grasping at the same problems. You can use the analogy in all sorts of
cases. I know that, for example, in the Province of Quebec, there are
those separatists who are advocating that if Quebec were to separate
from Canada, naturally it would be the European Union that we would
turn to as a model. It would free Quebec and the rest of Canada, and
ultimately, then, it would have an effect on Americans because this
would then factor into NAFTA and all the other relationships that we
have on the North American Continent. So the European Union is a
very useful model for many things, but when you look at it from our
perspective in relation to this group and NAFTA, where do we find
serious solutions to our problems?
The differences are just so extraordinary, when you stop to think
about it. The European Union is basically a civil law concept. It is a
Cartesian thing. General DeGaulle was right when he said they should
not let the British in. There is nothing worse than those common-law
folks. It is our whole attitude and everything and everybody we talked
about. They made it clear that, ever since England bought it, everything
has gone wrong. And it is largely because there is a totally different
attitude between the civil law and the common-law systems.
There are many ways that I would argue with you that the structures
that we have in NAFTA and the structures that are in the European
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Union reflect that fundamental difference between a Cartesian/civilian
approach to matters, and a common-law approach. It is only one dimension to it or one limb, if I can use Pat's analogy from this morning.
But, there is an aspect of it that is interesting. The European Union
grew out of a series of treaties that are called framework treaties. I
think it is called CAD. It is not a standard trick in law or an ordinary
agreement. It forms the rules under which certain fundamental obligations are created between the states, but it also recognizes that the nature of those rules are so extensive and have such incredibly far-reaching consequences, that they need institutions to apply them and make
them work. It has, therefore, created a set of institutions which are
legislative in nature; the Council is a legislative institution; the Commission is a supernational executive which applies the rules in ways that
are quite extraordinary.
You mentioned the Credite Lyonnaise bank case. I am no longer on
the board. Credite Lyonnaise, as you know, is a very important bank. It
has gone through a lot of problems. You may have seen recently in the
press that the French government owns the Credite Lyonnaise Bank and
wants to restructure it. It is a very, very important institution in France,
and it is very important that it be restructured. It is having trouble with
the European Commission, which is telling the bank that they cannot
restructure that way because it violates our subsidy rules. This would be
inconceivable, if you can imagine, in the United States or Canada in our
relations having anything of that nature. We will come back to that.
The E.U. has a Parliament which addresses issues of democracy and
what are called the democratic debts. It has a court with very substantive powers that, in my view, has completely changed the shape, not
only of European law, but the European court, which has probably been
the primary engine of European integration. I will come back to that,
too. It has been a very, very important institution in that system.
Finally, since the European Act of 1988 and the Maastricht Treaty,
there has been a substantial transfer of power to Brussels. The consequences are that, in many ways, there is a greater form of economic
union within the E.U. than there is within my own country of Canada.
Certainly there is the element of free movement of professionals in the
European Union. If you have ever tried as a lawyer or an architect or a
doctor to move around Canada, you will recognize that, in fact, there
are barriers to the free movement of individuals in Canada that do not
exist anymore within Europe. And in case you think the United States is
any better, look at some of California's more idiosyncratic environmental laws and try to drive a truck full of some lime from Nevada down
into California. You will find that it is often harder to get into Califor-
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nia than it is to get across the European borders these days. So we all
have within our own constitutional frameworks distortions and problems
which are being dealt with under our own constitutional arrangements.
In Europe, they are dealing with it in what I would call a constitutional
way.

And just one final thought about the difference between our own
relationships, NAFMA and Europe. The other night I had dinner with
John Beck, who is the European representative in Ottawa. You have one
in Washington as well, a common ambassador. He is not an ambassador
from Europe, he is a representative of the European Commission. If you
look at what is going on and you look at the G-7 meetings today, you
will see there is a representative there from Europe at the G-7. Why?
Because the European nation-states can no longer speak for fifty or sixty
percent of the economic matters that are being spoken to at the G-7
meetings. They have to have a representative of Europe; they have to
have two of them, in fact. They have got to have the President of
Council and they have got to have the President of the Commission in
order to function.
So it is an international organization. It has a constitution, and it is
very, very different. That is not to say that it does not have its problems; it is becoming enormously complex. I was in Germany recently, I
met with the German-European Community's Committee of Parliament,
by their House, and they told me that they meet regularly with their
Lander representatives. They spend a great deal of time in Brussels, the
German Parliamentarians, and the French do, as well; they have to. So
you have got the European Parliament; you have got the members of
Parliament locally, but in Germany, for example, the German Federal
House meets with the Lander representatives, fifty of them on a regular
basis. They all go up to Brussels together and they have to work it out
that way. I wonder if maybe that is not a crazy thing we could look at
ourselves, more cross-border regions. In that case, it might even be
useful in Canada, sometimes, if our Parliamentary Committees were to
meet in some of our Provincial counterparts in matters where we have
cross-border, cross-jurisdictional issues to discuss.
So this is a very different thing. I am not saying it is perfect. Anybody who is watching the British election at the moment knows it has
its problems. It arrives out of Europe, so let us not kid ourselves. If you
talk to the French about what Denmark does to constantly put a stick in
the spokes of things, you will soon get a lively conversation going. And
if you talk to even someone as knowledgeable as Mr. Titener, I had
dinner with him before Christmas, he was telling me that in many ways
he thinks the EMU proposition is a way of dealing with the fact that
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the European political institutions are not able to bring the integration
process together close enough by themselves. Therefore, they are creating a European monitoring union to force the political thing to come
together and gel. I thought that was not a bad analogy.
In many ways, in Canada, I think, if we did not have a common
monetary system, we would be less of a unitary state than Europe is
today. It is, in fact, the common money that makes Canada in many
ways the political dimension of a country. And what the Germans and
French are trying to do by creating common money, in a way, is to get
over the political problems that are getting in the way of European economic integration.
This is a far cry from what we have here, if we look at NAFTA. It
is a loose treaty, not a traite de c6te. It is a trade law. We do have a
commission, which, as we know from Larry this morning, never meets,
or I believe it met once in April. It really consists of three trade ministers who are far too busy to get together very often to meet. It has no
permanent court. Instead, it has a whole host of ad hoc procedures scattered throughout; we have Chapter 20, Chapter 19 issued, and Chapter
11. We have got different ad hockery on the environmental side, a
different way to solve the disputes on the labor side agreements, et
cetera. It has, as Larry said this morning, no core. There is no core to
it.
What we have to decide, of course, is whether this is what we want
and whether this corresponds to our needs, and whether this corresponds
to our level of economic integration. That is what we are really here to
discuss. Then, of course, the problem is, what happens if we were to
decide that it does not correspond to our needs or the needs of the
institution, or perhaps to us as Canadians. We want to see one thing,
the Mexicans want to see another, and the Americans want to see another. Our other problem is the political dimension that has come up here
this morning, and that is the fact that with the U.S. Congress, whatever
we might think and what we might want and what we are going to get
are totally different.
Just look at the debate on the chemical weapons convention that is
taking place in Congress today. This is mind-boggling. This was an
American conception. They have to deal with the problem of Iraq, the
problem of the breakup of Russia, and all these incredibly loathsome
weapons of mass destruction with a potential to destroy everybody. It all
came together as an American security issue. Now the United States
does it once again. It is the history of the United States. It did it with
the GATT. It did it with the League of Nations. It will kill it because
U.S. senators are saying it is not in the interest of American corpora-
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tions to have this intrusive international interference in the way in which
they mix their paints.
If we do not do this, we are all going to be in trouble because there
are a lot of other little paint plants around the world, out there in Libya
and other places, that if somebody is not inspecting them, they can
cause a lot of trouble. All Timothy McVeigh had when he drove down
to Oklahoma City and blew up the Federal Building there was some
fertilizer in the back of a truck that he mixed together in different ways,
and that is the nature of the modem system. If we do not have an international system that comes to grips, we are going to be in trouble. But
it is pretty clear that our American colleagues are just not at the point
where they are willing to accept that. And it may be because the United
States is such a world power now, people have not realized that it is
vulnerable. This is a fact of life we have to deal with.
We can talk about the WTO case and the Helms-Burton bill. I do
not wish to speak ill of Senator Helms, because I am very grateful to
him. He has given me a great deal of prominence in my country that I
did not have before. Speaking out regularly against it, I achieve all sorts
of notoriety, so I am very fond of Senator Helms. I think he should
carry on what I consider his reckless morning dialogues with Mr. Castro
as to how they can cause as much trouble as they can to keep each
other in the news.
But I do want to come back to what I was saying about the institutional structure, because whatever we say about whether we can get
something tighter or better, the problem is, will we? And the question is
what? If I can speak from a Canadian perspective for a moment, it
seems to me what we need as Canadians is a greater degree of legislative and court security than presently is in the system precisely because
it has been so effective. I mean, it has been immensely effective.
We can argue to what extent this would have occurred anyway,
outside or inside the NAFTA framework, but just look at the numbers.
We are talking about a billion dollars a day in two-way trade between
Canada and the United States, much of it in service trade; much of it is
in goods the Canadians never produced before for export. We are becoming an export country of a very sophisticated manufacturer of products. The recent Canada/Chile Free Trade Agreement was not signed so
we could send our traditional exports of wood products and things down
to Chile. We are competitors with most of them on those issues. We are
sending machinery and other things. This was an important agreement
for us because we wanted to break in to much more sophisticated markets. And it was a very important agreement for us because we want to
make sure we have investment security, since Canada is becoming a
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country which has extensive foreign direct investments itself, as well as
being a receiver of foreign direct investment.
So this Canadian, U.S., and Mexican agreement has been important
for us. Our Mexican trade has developed, I understand, fifty percent
since we signed the agreement. That is up to seven billion dollars a
year, which is really significant beside the U.S. trade. But we as a
country find this very important. We are very trade-dependent. Thirtyfive cents of every dollar out of every Canadian's pocket is directly
related to trade. One out of three jobs in Canada is directly related to
our trade. So this is very, very important for us. And it is very important, then, that we have in our trading relations with our trading partners
institutions which guarantee the access to those markets and guarantee a
stability and security in the rules and the application of the way in
which it will develop.
So we are going to try and decide how well we are working. It is
one of those awful premises, for instance, is the glass half-empty or is
the glass half-full? It depends to whom you are talking. It is true that
most of our trade is free of problems. But the problems that we do
have, do they reflect in such a way as to make you nervous about it?
In my committee, our experience has been extraordinary. What we
do is hear all the complaints. The Steel Committee, for example, comes
in and complains about those Americans. They say you will not believe
what they make you file. Then they say, why not adopt the same thing?
Let us have mirror legislation and harass them just as much as they
harass us. I say, wait a minute. Does a mouse harass an elephant very
successfully? Is this going to work? And so we get into these arguments
about what would work against the Americans, and what would be successful? The theory is to build up this enormously harassing machine
which we will then offer to dismantle in return for the Americans dismantling theirs. So, of course, we try to talk to our Mexican friends and
get them to bring in some things as well. But it is the old question of
how do we get the rules, because for us as Canadians it is the debate
between the rule diplomacy and power diplomacy. We are going to lose
in the power diplomacy, so we want the rule diplomacy. If we look at
the European Union, where do we get to have any specific analogies?
But, if you want to look at some of the comparisons between, say,
the European Union and NAFTA, look at the expansion problem. It
seems to me, one of the problems we have in terms of our arrangement
is expansion. I think the NAFTA should expand. I think our bringing
Chile in was a good idea. We hope Iraq is kind of a stalking-horse in
the United States between those negotiations, although knowledgeable
people well know that in the Canada/Chile Free Trade Agreement we
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abandoned anti-dumping duties between our two jurisdictions, which
clearly would cause considerable sounds of alarm in Washington if that
was trying to worm its way into any expansion in NAFTA. But apart
from that, I think it is probably an agreement which can largely be
extended in the NAFTA consequences, but we have been watching this
process now for some years.
Everyone talks about free trade in the Americas by the year 2005.
This will be done. Mr. Clinton says that it will be done. You look over
the shoulder of the U.S. Congress. I met with Mr. Gillman and his colleagues in Singapore at the WTO meetings. It was very clear that between the Republicans and the Democrats who were there, there was
just no agreement whatsoever on the side deals. I think the chance of
seeing any agreement with Chile or with NAFrA is extremely remote,
to put it in those terms.
The political objections are not just, by the way, at the level of the
United States. They are at the level of grass roots politics, the Ross
Perot factor, et cetera. I am not saying that we in Canada are any different. I will be fighting in an election over the next few weeks where,
with the NDP, this issue will be raised. You have exported jobs. They
are already talking in the House about the multilateral investment agreement being cooked up over OECD, like it were some evil conspiracy on
behalf of the Liberals to sell the country. We know multilateral investment is about as far away from being anything seriously inhibiting on
sovereignty, you can imagine. This is the dialogue of elections and
politics.
I was downtown the other day fighting for the preservation of a
very important hospital. The present government of Ontario is closing
four of the eight hospitals in my district, and it is causing a lot of grief
for a lot of people. I was handed a piece of paper at a meeting I went
to which told me that the reason why the hospital was being closed was
because of NAFTA. Well, of course, then I had to give my speech to
keep the hospital open. I had all these people in the back, all these leftwing people booing and hissing that we sold them out. Canada is in
NAFTA; NAFTA did this to us. We would not have to close this hospital if we had not sold them down the river to this multilateral globalization scheme, of which NAFTA is one component part. This is a dimension in the politics of all our countries. Expanding NAFTA, for many
people in Canada and the United States, is just not odd. What else do
we do with this thing we have?
Compared to the European Union, since that is supposed to be a
focal point in my talk, it is extraordinary what is happening in terms of
expansion. You are talking about fifteen countries, to bring them in, in
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the Eastern Hemisphere; Poland, Hungary, the former Soviet Union
countries. They are dealing with the incredibly difficult problem of
Turkey, which is an extraordinarily complex political issue today, given
the Turkish human rights issues and the other problems prevalent there.
In fact, there really is no other European country in any way that represents a potential trojan force of the whole Islamic issue coming into the
European framework. But they have to deal with it, and it is dealt with
in the context of Cyprus and other extraordinary issues. I am not saying
they have solved them, but they are working on these issues. They are
going to have meetings this summer, where new countries will be admitted into the European Union from Eastern Europe with incredible adjustment consequences, but they seem to be able to do it.
We do not seem to be able to do it, and it has had consequences
for us. I think one area which affected us was when the United States
signed independently its agreement with the European Union, a framework agreement or agenda, whatever it was called, in Madrid some
years ago. We were left out, and we had to go and negotiate our own
agreement, although it wound up in the fish war between ourselves and
Spain, and a whole host of Canada-European issues. How can you talk
about a free trade arrangement of the North Atlantic if the United States
is going about it independently; Canada is going about it independently,
and Mexico is going about it independently when, meanwhile, we have
our NAFTA. What it does to the rules of origin criteria just drives
everybody bananas. Technically, what rules of origin are there under
these sorts of circumstances? We are going to have enough trouble
bringing in Chile for that. That seems to be one area we are looking at
to see how we can have at least some coordinating mechanism for the
expansion.
Secondly, I think we really do have to look at this question of
institutional framework for dispute resolution. I mentioned the House
work earlier. I will not go back to that, but the cultural issue is going
to give us a great deal of trouble, if not serious problems, to discuss in
the next few years. These are political issues. When we talk culture in
Canada, we are not talking business and Disney World the way people
are in the United States. When I talk culture and the preservation of
Canadian culture, I am talking about whether I can get gun control into
my country, and whether or not I can keep a health care system that is
different from the United States. That is the importance of a cultural
dimension in our country.
If we do not have cultural institutions that allow us to talk to each
other and preserve that communication, we are not going to exist. We
are not going to have those. Those are very important to us. We are not
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going to have a NAFI7A. We are not going to have an agreement with
the United States if that has to go, because we will not give it up.
These are very, very important, and they are going to cause real flash
points because the cultural community of the United States is on a
bandwagon to dismantle these because they are worried about what it
means in terms of their relationship to Europe.
I talked to the Chairman of the Cultural Committee in the European
Parliament about this, and I have talked to Mr. Viska Vistang about it.
This is a big issue. It is going to move right out of the WTO agenda
and right through a lot of issues. It is going to be very important to
hear. The institutional framework for managing that stuff is going to be
very important.
Finally, we have the issue of the trade remedies. The AD obviously
has disappeared in Europe. Countervailing is being totally replaced in
Europe by a different system, a European system of management. How
well is the panel system working is the question we have asked. That
has been a subject of very interesting testimony before our committee
recently. I has gotten mixed reviews. There are those who say the challenges have worked well. And, in fact, it has worked so well that there
are fewer challenges now, and that is partJy because it has put a discipline, particularly on the Canadian and American internal systems, in
such a way that we get fewer challenges. So this is a good thing. This
is the half-full glass, if you want to look at it that way, so it is successful. I think the Mexican experience has not reached that far because we
have not had the same experience in Mexico.
Some people have suggested to us that we as Canadian politicians
should consider the WTO rules today because they are more favorable
to us. We should ignore NAFTA panels. We should go to the WTO
because it is a multilateral framework and because there is greater certainty there, and there is a potential of the appeals court and the way it
works. We should be looking at that.
Can you imagine in the European Union if somebody said we
should not go to the European court, but we should go to the WTO? If
we are talking in the context of a NAFrA-European Union comparison,
it would just be unthinkable. We do have to look at the possibility of a
permanent court. It has enormous advantages, whether trilingual, Spanish, English, French, quadrilingual - well, trilingual would be French,
English, and Spanish, it would be quadricultural, if I may say that.
Canadians have a civil law. Provincially, we could deal with a lot of
Beatrice's problems. We could put some formalism in there and have
some nice papers to stamp, get rid of these different tribunals that are
going to be skulling around Chapter 20, 19, and 11 side agreements, all
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this sort of ad hockery, and bring it into one. I do not think we will see
it for the same reason that we did not see our CBABA proposals suggested. It does not sink like a stone, because people would not worry if
it were too successful. A success would threaten the group who is very
nervous about the sovereignty issue.
I agree with Beatrice also in that, if anybody is going to pay for it,
of course we know exactly who will do it, or at least who will pay for
the larger share. We may need it more, but you guys will use it more. I
think this is something that requires a serious thought. And I do not
have the time to discuss this with you this morning. But have a look at
it, if you are interested in the subject. Take a look at what the European
Community has done. It is extraordinary what happened in the thirtyodd years of the European Union.
It started off with a case like Kosta, where it provided a concept of
directly applicable law, which in itself is an extraordinary thing. We
might have a look at ourselves as another European example. In the
Kosta case, there are two concepts which are fundamental to European
law, that of privacy and direct applicability. Direct applicability means
any citizen of any country can go and take a European norm before its
domestic court and argue it and have the court consider it the application of a local law. The privacy rule means that, where the jurisdictional
element is correct, the European norm will trump the local and consistent law. These are the two basic concepts of European law.
The advantage of it is, without getting into privacy, because I realize we are into serious problems there in our context of NAFTA. Even
if we could get into the first idea that the NAFTA rules would be directly applicable in our courts, it is a far more democratic concept than
always being dependent on a Chapter 20 panel where I have to go cap
in hand to the Canadian government and get them to challenge the
American government. You bring it into your federal court. We want to
challenge one of these things with something like when I drive my
truck across the border and they have got a problem with the labeling.
Maybe you could just challenge that yourself, right in your own court.
Or, you could challenge it in the U.S. court. Go get a mandamus
against the customs inspector. Maybe the Mexicans can just go get a
mandamus by an American authority against their own people to apply
the NAFTA rule. Why not, rather than having to go through this traditional state-by-state thing.
We are talking about countries with a billion dollars a day and
two-way trade and hundreds of millions of dollars of cross-border investments and intra-firm trade. This is enormous. Some people say that
our intra-firm trade is at a level which makes us more economically
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integrated than Europe. Why would we not have some system at least
where we can get direct access to legal ruling bodies by the citizens
involved to make rules on these subjects rather than having to go back
to the traditional rules of international law and state-to-state adjudication.
I will just leave you with that last thought, then, that maybe there is
something in the European Union after all that may not be the direct
applicability of many of their institutions, because the level of economic
integration and political integration is significantly different than ours
and it probably calls for very different solutions, but there are germs of
ideas there that are worthy of looking at. One of them could well be to
just persuade our courts. There is room in the United States for it. International lawyers here well know it, the Fuji case, for a recognition of
applicability of international law in domestic law. In Canada it is more
complicated, because we have the British constitutional system. But
there are possibilities now arising out of foreign cases and some other
recent cases which show that our courts are more receptive to the need
to apply international rules because they recognize that the international
economic integration that we presently live in affects the development of
law, as well as the development of politics and economics. Judges are
capable and able to deal with these issues. They should be encouraged
to do so. You can let us politicians then resolve the serious problems in
the country, and let us politicians go on with this, having the fun of
getting reelected and just blithering on about our problems.

